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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
May 10, 1984 Conference
List 3, Sheet 3
No. 83-1569
olL ·

MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORP.

Cert to CAl {Campbell, Coffin,
Bownes)

v.
SOLER CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH
SUMMARY:

Timely

Federal/Civil

Petr challenges a holding that, notwithstanding agree-

~

ment by parties to submit all disputes arising out of their contract
to arbitration, an alleged antitrust violatior~ arising out of the inte ~

tract is nonarbitrable.
FACTS:

Petr, of course, is a well-known Japanese corporation and

automaker, which manufactures vehicles for sale in certain territories
outside the United States through Chrysler dealers.

Resp is a Puerto

.

Rico corporation and formerly a franchised Chrysler dealer.
(

Resp entered into a "distributor agreement" with Chrysler.

In 1979,
At the

same time, it entered into a separate "sales procedure agreement" with
both Chrysler and Petr. Paragraph VI of the sales procedure agreement
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provided in relevant part that all disputes which may arise "shall be
finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules
and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association."

Two

years later, Resp became unable to meet its minimum sales commitments
in its territory.

Resp's inventory grew, its finances worsened, and

Petr began withholding shipments of new vehicles to Resp.

Eventually,

Petr stored 966 vehicles that otherwise would have been shipped to
Resp in Puerto Rico.
In February 1982, Resp disclaimed responsibility for the 966 vehicles stored in Japan.

A month later, Petr brought suit against Resp

in federal district court, raising .a host of claims.

On the basis of

its claims, Petr sought an order compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the Convention's implementing
legislation.

Resp denied the claims and counterclaimed, alleging,

inter alia, violation of the Sherman Act.

The District Court held

that all of Petr's claims and all but two of Resp's counterclaims fell
within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement.

The court

explicitly held that Resp's counterclaim for violation of the Shermah
Act came within the terms of the agreement.

In express reliance upon

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), the District Court
rejected Resp's argument that an antitrust claim could not, as a matter of law, be referred to arbitration, dismissed the Sherman Act
claim, and referred it to arbitration.

It found, "based on the rea-

soning of the Court in Scherk refusing to extend Wilke [ v. Swan, 346
U.S. ,427 (1953)) to international securities transactions," that the

I

Second Circuit's decision in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire

&

Co., 391 F.2d 821 (CA2 1968), should not govern antitrust

claims arising out of international agreements.

..
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HOLDING BELOW:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District

Court's holding that each of the claims and counterclaims that had
been referred by the District Court to arbitration, including the
Sherman Act claim, were within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
Notwithstanding its finding that the antitrust claim fell within the
terms of the arbitration agreement, however, the Court of Appeals held
that litigation was the proper means for resolution of the Sherman Act
claim.

As is true of antitrust claims arising out of domestic con-

tracts, American Safety, supra, said the court, antitrust claims in an
international context should not be submitted to arbitration.

(Be-

cause the question was one of first impression, the court had requested the views of the Department of Justice and the State Department on
this issue.
I

Both had urged that the court apply to international con-

tracts the same exception that has for years been applied to domestic /
contracts.)
The court noted that courts are unanimous that Sherman Act claims
arising out of domestic contracts should not be submitted to arbitration.

Such a policy is dictated by numerous policy concerns.

Among

others, the complexity of antitrust issues renders them ill-suited for
arbitration.

Second, the antitrust laws are thought so important to

the functioning of a free economy that the combined efforts of government and the private parties are needed to enforce them.

And third,

enforcement of the antitrust laws is thought too important to be
lodged in arbitrators from the business community who have a vested
interest in the application of those laws.
The court saw no reason why these same policy concerns do not

(

apply in the international context.

It suggested that other nations

are not ignorant of "the primacy" we accord our antitrust laws, and it
observed that the Republic of Germany also prohibits enforcement of

- 4 ~s

its antitrust laws through arbitration.

The court said that it doubt-

ed that other countries would describe the interest of the United
States in the enforcement of its antitrust laws as "'parochial' in the
sense of being petty provincialisms."
It then considered whether there are any policy reasons supporting application of the rule against arbitration of antitrust claims.
In this regard, the court said that the "insulation of agreements with
some international coloration from the antitrust exception would go
far to limit it to the most minor and significant of business dealings."

It reasoned further that "suppliers and sellers could achieve

immunity from antitrust law threats and sanctions by the simple expedient of co-opting some foreign or international entity into the arrangement."

I

Against this background, the Court of Appeals concluded

that the doctrine of nonarbitrability of antitrust issues applies "at
least [to] the kind of international agreement we confront in this
case--an agreement governing the sales and distribution of vehicles in
the United States."

Pet., at A-18 (emphasis in original).

The court then turned to the question whether the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards prevented a
holding that antitrust claims are nonarbitrable.

On this score, it

concluded that an agreement to arbitrate is not "an agreement within
the meaning of" Article II(3) of the Convention because such an agreement does not concern "a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration," as required by Article II(l), presumably because the policy
of this country does not permit the submission of such an issue to
arbitration.

'

=--

Finally, the court adefessed the question of the applicability of
this Court's decision in Yc herk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
(1974).

It acknowledged that Scherk "poses a considerable roadblock"

-
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to excepting antitrust from the general rule of arbitrability "if its

i

holding is extrapolated to fit a situation of demonstrably greater
impact on the United States and a public policy of incommensurably
greater depth."

It nonetheless distinguished Scherk, largely on the

different policies at issue in the respective cases.

---

The securities

laws at issue in Scherk were enacted to protect a relatively small
~

group of investors; the antitrust laws, on the other hand, were designed to protect the general public by preserving a competitive atmosphere nationwide.

Balancing the private party's interest in having

antitrust claims arbitrated against the public interest "in the preservation of economic order in the United States," the court found that
the latter prevailed.
The court thought it important as well that parties "could not be
blind to the obvious fact that American law would normally apply to
any claim of monopolization or restraint of trade," and that antitrust
is not a "parochial" consideration of the kind referred to in Scherk.
The court also noted that the Court in Scherk did not rely upon the
Convention for its holding; the Convention provisions were said only
to "confirm" the decision required under the Federal Arbitration Act !
CONTENTIONS:

(1) Petr contends that the decision below, refusing

to require an antitrust claim to be arbitrated, is "at odds" with the
Federal Arbitration Act, which provides that an arbitration agreement
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," and
Southland Corp. v. Keating, __ U.S. __ (1984), which recited the
above, language from the Federal Arbitration Act as one of only two

1

exceptions to the enforceability of arbitration agreements.

If per-

mitted to stand, the decision will disrupt the certainty intended by
the Federal Arbitration Act.

Moreover, courts should not be allowed

- 6 -

to engage in the kind of ad hoc decisions on whether a particular
statutory claim is sufficiently important to defeat congressional policy as expressed in the Federal Arbitration Act.

The Court should

make it clear that it is for Congress to strike the balance in determining which, if any, claims should be exempt from arbitration.

When

Congress has wanted to exempt certain classes of litigants or categories of claims from arbitration, it has done so explicitly.
(2) Petr next contends that, to the extent the Court of Appeals
held that an antitrust dispute is not "capable of settlement by arbitration," it refused to enforce a treaty of the United States.

If

"capable of settlement by arbitration" were to have the meaning that
the Court of Appeals said, the Convention would be but an invitation
to courts to impose their own notions of wise policy respecting arbitration.

An agreement to submit to arbitration a securities dispute

arising out of international commerce must be enforced, Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., supra.

Since nothing in Scherk limits its holding

to securities actions, the same must be true of antitrust actions
arising from international transactions.

The lower court's conclusion

that the policies underlying the antitrust laws are greater in significance than those of the securities laws, thus requiring a different
result, is without foundation.
Resp points out that the Second Circuit's decision not to force
arbitration of antitrust disputes arising out of domestic disputes has
been followed by every court to consider the issue.

It then notes

that this Court has long recognized that, for public policy reasons,
cert&in claims {Title VII
(

arbitration.

&

Securities Act) should not be referred to

Citing to United States v. Topco Associates Inc., 405

U.S. 596, 610 (1972), Resp says the public's interest in judicial resolution of antitrust claims at least "stands on equal footing" with
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the public's interest in judicial enforcement of

7pb LtPi
ese statutory

l

claims.
This case is distinguishable from Scherk p incipally for the reason cited by the Court of Appeals--the strength of the public interest
in judicial enforcement of the antitrust laws, a
rities laws.

opposed to the secu-

Moreover, as the Scherk Court went to pains to empha-

size, the dispute there had only a tangential re ationship to the
United States.

Here, in contrast, the relations ip to the United

States is direct and substantial; Petr

ly expanded its sales

to the American marketplace, it has restricted

e sale of vehicles in

question solely to that market.
Finally, the Court of Appeals did not
of the United States.
(

Article V(2) of the

enforcement of an arbitral award

provides that
where the subject mat-

country, or where the enforcement o

tions where a country would
such an appropriate situ

treaty

the award would be contrary to

to enforce arbitration.

This is

ion, as Germany has determined with respec~

refuse to enforce a treaty of the United States; the court simply held
that antitrust claims, to the extent that they are nonarbitrable under
the laws in the majority of the circuits, are not "capable of settlement by arbitration" within the meaning of the exception expressly

(

provi~ed for by the Convention.

y

s is no more than an interpreta-

tion of the treaty's exception.

Southland Corp. v. Keating does not

in any way bar the result reached by the Court of Appeals.

Petr's

various contentions, thus, in effect reduce to claims that the deci-

..

-
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sion below declining to submit to arbitration an antitrust claim concededly within the terms of the agreement between the parties conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act, this Court's decision in

?
J

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., and the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

These claims are substan-

tial, even if they would not ultimately prevail.

!@
erations.

Alberto-Culver had decided to expand its overseas opAlberto-Culver contracted with Scherk, who owned businesses

engaged in the manufacture of toiletries and the licensing of trademarks for toiletries, for the transfer to Alberto-Culver of Scherk's
businesses and the rights held by the businesses to trademarks in cosmetic goods.

The contract embodied warranties by Scherk guaranteeing

unencumbered ownership of the trademarks.

The contract also contained

an arbitration clause providing that "any controversy or claim [that]
shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof" would be referred to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in
Paris, France, and that the laws of Illinois would govern resolution
of the dispute.

Alberto-Culver subsequently discovered that the

trademarks were subject to substantial encumbrances.

When Scherk re-

fused Alberto-Culver's tender of the trademarks and attempt to rescind
the contract, Alberto-Culver brought suit in federal district court,
contending that Scherk's fraudulent representations on the status of
the trademarks violated §lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule lOb-5.

The District Court enjoined Scherk from proceeding to

~ : ~ ation, pursuant to the contract.

S~

The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

~hi { Court, 5-4, reversed, rejecting Alberto-Culver's contentions

that the Securities Exchange Act claim was nonarbitrable under the
Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan, ~

ko, the Court held

that a claim under §12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 did not have
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to be submitted to arbitration, notwithstanding an agreement purporting to require submission of all claims to arbitration, principally
because §14 of the Act prohibited a party from waiving its right to a
judicial forum.)

Alberto-Culver's contention that Wilko controlled,

said the Court, ignored the "significant" and "crucial differences"
between the agreement in Wilko and that in Scherk.

417 U.S., at 515.

The Alberto-Culver/Scherk agreement, it noted, was "a truly international agreement."

Ibid.

Alberto-Culver was an American company do-

ing the bulk of its activity here; Scherk was a citizen of Germany and
his businesses were organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein.

The negotiations leading to the contract took place in several

different countries, and the subject matter of the contract concerned
the sale of businesses in Europe, whose activities were largely, if
not entirely, confined to Europe.

"Such a contract," said the Court,

"involves considerations and policies significantly different from
those found controlling in Wilko."

Ibid.
-

After observing that, absent an arbitration provision, considerable uncertainty existed at the time of the agreement as to the law
applicable to disputes between the parties, the Court went on to say ·
that

(

[s]uch uncertainty will almost inevitably exist
with respect to any contract touching two or more
countries, each with its own substantive laws and
conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be
litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an
almost indispensable precondition to achievement of
the orderliness and predictability essential to any
international business transaction. Furthermore, such
a provision obviates the danger that a dispute under
the agreement might be submitted to a forum hostile to
the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with
the problem area involved.
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country
to enforce an international arbitration agreement
would not only frustrate these purposes, but would
invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by
the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages.

- 10 Id., at 516-517.

v

'I

After a brief discussion of The Bremen v. Zapato Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972), where it was held that a forum-selection clause
~
must be respected in United States courts, the Scherk Court emphasized
that
[a]n agreement to arbitrate before a specified
tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forumselection clause that posits not only the situs of
suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving
the dispute. The invalidation of such an agreement in
the case before us would not only allow the respondent
to repudiate its solemn promise but would, as well,
reflect a "parochial concept that all disputes must be
resolved under our laws and in our courts •.•• We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed
by our laws, and resolved in our courts.
Id., at 519 (footnotes omitted; quoting Zapato, supra, at 9).
The Court did not find it necessary to rest its decision on the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards.

It did note, however, that its decision was "confirmed" by

legislation implementing the Convention, specifically 9

u.s.c.

§201,

which provides that the Convention "shall be enforced in United States
courts •••• "

Id., at 520 n. 15.

While the composition of the Court has changed somewhat since
Scherk was decided, I think it likely that at least several members of
the Court would be of the view tha ~

k controls thi ~

that, consequently, arbitration should have been ordered.

: )and
In this

case, as in Scherk, Petr and Resp were parties to "a truly international agreement."

No less uncertainty would exist here than in

Scherk were the Court to permit the lower courts to refuse to enforce

.

arbitration of antitrust claims.
(

No less so here is a contract provi-

sion specifying the forum and the law to be applied "an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction."

The

.

~

- 11 same danger exists with respect to antitrust suits that a dispute will
be submitted to a forum "hostile" to the interests of one party,
either in the absence of an arbitration agreement or given a refusal
to enforce an arbitration agreement, that was a source of concern in
Scherk.

Refusal to honor an arbitration agreement in the face of an

antitrust claim evidences the same "parochial" view that all disputes
must be resolved under our laws that in large part underlay the decision in Scherk.

Finally, there is no more reason that an antitrust

claims should be exempt from arbitration insofar as the terms of the
Arbitration Act are concerned, than there is for an exemption for securities law violations.
In sum, I think Petr is correct that there is a substantial claim
that the decision below conflicts with the Arbitration Act, providing
that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract," and a decision of this Court--Scherk-interpreting that Act.

The Court in Scherk did intimate that a situa-

tion might arise where the contacts with the foreign country were "so
insignificant or attenuated" that the rule of Wilke might apply.
U.S., at 517 n. 11.

4li

However, it is doubtful that this is that case,

given that Petr is a Japanese Corporation, with its principal place of
business in Japan, and that the vehicles in question were manufactured
in Japan and stored in Japan when Resp became insolvent.

Additional-

ly, the underlying conduct of the alleged antitrust violation is conduct that occurred in Japan.

It may also be, as the Court of Appeals

held ~nd Resp suggests, that there are persuasive policy distinctions

(

between the securities laws at issue in Scherk and the antitrust laws
here that might counsel a policy of refusal to submit antitrust claims
to international arbitration.

Moreover, an argument can be made that
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l

because Petr ships its vehicles into the domestic market, it should
expect to have its antitrust claims resolved in American courts.

But,

while one can assert that there need not be an express congressional
exemption for antitrust claims if the courts have so held and Congress
has acquiesced, I do not read Scherk or the Arbitration Act to allow
the courts to make this kind of policy assessment; as Petr contends,
such a decision would appear to be one for Congress alone.
Were the Court to reverse on the Arbitration Act issue, presumably a remand would cause the Court of Appeals to reassess its holding
on the Convention; that holding rested squarely on the ground that
antitrust claims are not arbitrable under the laws of the United
States.

If the Court is not interested in the principal issue, I can-

not say that the Convention issue alone is worthy of review here.
There are any number of options.

First, every court of appeal to

address the arbitrability of antitrust claims in the context of a domestic agreement has held that they are nonarbitrable, but to the extent that this case involves an international agreement, it is one of
first impression.

One could await a conflict.

The Court of Appeals

holding was limited to agreements relating to "sales and distributiori
of vehicles in the United States."

There was apparently no conflict

in Scherk, however; the Court took the case solely because of the "importance of the question presented."

417 U.S., at 510.

This issue

would seem no less important, particularly if the Court continues to
have an interest in the international arbitration process.
Second, the Court could call for the views of the Solicitor General., Given that the Court has once recognized the importance of the
(

general issue in Scherk, arguably this may be unnecessary in terms of
the decision whether or not to take the case.

As noted, both the De-

partment of Justice--which may or may not have involved the Solicitor-
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-and the State Department, expressed their views to the Court of Appeals that such claims should be nonarbitrable.

If the Court does not

now CVSG, he can come in as amicus if the case is taken.

Third, the

Court could simply grant the case.
I lean slightly toward recommending a grant.

However, I am un-

certain enough about the potential disruptive effect internationally
of the holding below that I recommend that the Court CVSG.
clearly has national and international ramifications.
the nature of its effect.

The case

The question is

If the SG says the ramifications are sig-

nificant, the Court can grant the case.

If, on the other hand, he

believes, for whatever reasons, that the international disruption is
negligible, the Court might well choose to await further developments.

I recommend CVSG.
There is a response.
May 2, 1984

Luttig
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SOLER CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH, INC.

v.

'f),:.MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORP.
SUMMARY:

Cert to CAl (Campbell, Coffin,
Bownes)
Federal/Civil

Timely

Cross-Petr challenges the holding below requiring it to

submit to arbitration one of its counterclaims under the Dealers' Day
in Court Act.

Additionally, it presents a question as to whether the

opinion below intended to require arbitration of its antitrust claim
under . the Puerto Rican antitrust statute.
FACTS:

This is~

ro ~

o.~

, which was re-

scheduled from the M~v 10 Conference so----!-t- could be considered with

~-~..e

l)S"1(.l

Vat~(l

k-ft<.,
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this cross-petition.
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The recommendation in 83-1569 is to CVSG.
>

I

refer you to the earlier memorandum for a cdrnplete- recitation of the
facts.

Essentially, Cross-Petr and Cross-Resp entered into a "sales

procedure agreement" pursuant to which all disputes would be "finally
settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association."

Cross-Petr

became unable to meet its minimum sales committments in its territory,
and Cross-Resp began to withhold vehicles that otherwise would have
been shipped to Cross-Petr in Puerto Rico.

Cross-Petr disclaimed re-

sponsibility for the vehicles that were stored on its behalf, and
Cross-Resp brought suit in federal district court, seeking an order
compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Cross-Petr

counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, violation of the Sherman Act,
the federal Dealers' Day in Court Act, and Puerto Rico's antitrust
act.

The District Court held that all of Cross-Resp's claims and all

but two of Cross-Petr's counterclaims fell within the scope of the
parties' arbitration agreement, and it referred all these claims to
arbitration.

The court explicitly held that Cross-Petr's counterclaim,.

for violation of the Sherman Act came within the terms of the agreement.
HOLDING BELOW:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District

Court's holding that each of the claims and counterclaims that that
court referred to arbitration, including the Sherman Act claim, were
within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

With the exception of

Cross-Petr's Sherman Act claim, and possibly its antitrust claim based

,.

on tne Puerto Rico statute, the court also affirmed the District
Court's order directing that all claims and counterclaims, including

-

3 -

Cross-Petr's counterclaims under the Dealer's Day in Court Act, 15

u.s.c.

§1221 et seq. be submitted to an arbitrator.

The Court of Ap-

peals declined for policy reasons to refer Cross-Petr's Sherman Act
claim to arbitration.
the petition.)

(This validity of this refusal is challenged in

There is some confusion over whether Cross-Petr's

antitrust claim under the Puerto Rico statute has been referred to
arbitration.

In this regard, the Court of Appeals simply reversed the

District Court's order "submitting [Cross-Petr's] Anti-Trust claims"
to arbitration.

Cross-Resp, however, has taken the position that this

claim must be submitted to arbitration.
CONTENTIONS:

(1) Cross-Petr contends that the Court of Appeals

erred in referring to arbitration its counterclaim under the Dealers'
Day in Court Act because Cross-Petr had not expressly agreed to arbitrate statutory claims.

In holding that this claim must be submitted

to arbitration because the factual allegations underlying the claim
"touched" upon arbitrable provisions of the Sales Procedure Agreement,
says Cross-Petr, the court adopted a standard in conflict with that of
the Ninth Circuit in Leya v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd.,
593 F.2d 857, cert. denied. 444

u.s.

827 (1979).

Before a party can

be compelled to arbitrate a statutory claim, there must be some "positive assurance" that the party agreed to do so.

The Court of Appeals

simply misunderstood the scope of the parties' arbitration clause;
they did not intend to arbitrate all disputes, but only selected ones.
(2) Cross-Petr also contends that Cross-Resp is mistaken in asserting
that the Court of Appeals intended to reverse the District Court's
order of arbitration only to the extent that it included the Sherman
Act claim, not Cross-Petr's antitrust claim under Puerto Rican law.

-
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The court could not have intended to send the state statutory issue to
arbitration, while holding that the Sherman Act claim could not be
arbitrated.
(1) Cross-Resp says that Cross-Petr simply wants to have this
Court narrowly construe a particular arbitration clause that by its
terms is very broad, requiring the submission to arbitration of "all
disputes, controversies or differences which may arise ••• out of or
in relation to ••• " the relevant provisions of the agreement.

It is

well-settled that an arbitration clause need not refer to a particular
statute to encompass claims under that statute.
certworthy in any event.

The claim is not

(2) Cross-Resp says that the contention that

the Court of Appeals did not intend to send the Puerto Rico antitrust
claim to arbitration is not worthy of the Court's attention.

Cross-

Resp's remedy is to file a motion for clarification in the Court of
Appeals.

At any rate, it is clear that the Court of Appeals did not

intend what Cross-Resp suggests it did.

As the opinion states, "(t]he

principal issue on this appeal is whether arbitration of federal antitrust claims may be compelled."

There is no hint of nonarbitrability

of the antitrust claim under the Puerto Rico statute.
DISCUSSION:

There is nothing certworthy here.

The only issue of

real consequence in this case apparently is whether the Sherman Act
claim is exempt from arbitration (83-1569).

(1) Cross-Petr's first

claim amounts to little more than a disagreement with the lower
court's construction of the scope of the arbitration agreement.
is no conflict with the Ninth Circuit's decision.

There

(2) As Cross-Resp

.

notes, the second claim raises only an issue of the meaning of the
Court of Appeals' opinion, i.e. whether, by referring to Cross-Petr's

•,

"Anti-Trust claims," the court intended to affirm the District Court's
order directing that the Dealers' Day in Court Act claim be arbitrated
or to reverse that decision.

It is essentially a factual question as

to the scope of the opinion of the court below.

This is a matter

properly addressed to that court in the first instance.
I recommend denial.
There is a response.
May 23, 1984
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To:

Justice Powell

From: Annmarie
Re:

Nos. 83-1569

&

83-1733

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp.

Background
CAl held that, notwithstanding the parties' agreement
to submit all disputes arbitration, an alleged antitrust
violation arising out of their international contract is
nonarbitrable.

Petr claims that this decision is "at odds"

with the Federal Aribtration Act and this Court's decision
in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
Cross-petr challenges CAl's holding that it must submit to
arbitration one of its countercliams under the Dealers' Day
in Court Act.

The Court called for the views of the SG.
SG's Views

The SG recommends that cert be denied in both cases.
The SG believes that CAl's holding that Soler's antitrust
____
__
claim is nonarbitrable is correct and notes that 1_
five
other

courts of appeals have reached the same decision.

The SG

also rejects as unpersuasive petr's claim that in holding

2.
the antitrust claim to be nonarbitrable, CAl failed to enforce the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

The Convention is limited by its

terms to matters capable of settlement by arbitration, and
there is little doubt that antitrust falls into the limited
class of such subjects.

v"

Finally, contrary to petr, the SG argues that CAl's
decision did not conflict with Scherck.

In Scherck, the

Court held that the arbitration clause in a "truly interna-

-----

tional contract" was enforceable in the context of a claim
for damages for violations of §lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.

The Court reasoned that (1) the arbitration

provision solved an "especially vexatious" problem, the
choice of law for an international contract dispute:

(2) a

parochial refusal by one country's courts to grant arbitration would "invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation
advantages:"

(3) any advantage a domestic plaintiff might

win by virtue of a ruling against arbitration may well be
"chimercal", since the foreign defendant might obtain a foreign court order nullifying such advantage.
The SG argues that the antitrust laws represent fundamental policies of the United States and not the kind of
"parochial" interest the Court wanted to avoid in Scherck.
The Convention on arbitration recognizes exceptions to arbitration agreements for just such fundamental principles, and
thus Scherck should not be deemed controlling here.

3.
SG be-

With respect to the c
lieves that they are factbound and not certworthy.
Discussion

I am persuaded that the SG, like CAl, is right on the
--.

merits of this case. I am not entirely convinced, however,
that the case isn't certworthy.
Scherck applies seems close.

The question whether
Five CAs apparently agree

- -------·-

that antitrust claims are not subject to arbitration, but

----------------------------------------

only one or two of these decisions came after Scherck.

-

A

grant would give the Court a chance to clarify Scherck's
applicability, and thus may be useful.
I recommend that you join three to grant No.1569 (the
petition) and vote to deny No. 1733 (the cross-petition).
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83-1569 Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth
83-1733 Soler Chrysler-Plymouth v. Mitsubishi Motors
MEMO TO FILE:

This brief memo is dictated after a preliminary
reading

of

the

Although

briefs.

I

am not entirely

at

rest, I am inclined to affirm CAl.
Soler is a Puerto Rican corporation (in effect a

u.s.

corporation)

Agreement
vehicles

that

(dealership)
made

in

entered

into

a

Distributor's

that gave Soler the right to sell
actually

Japan

made

by

a

Japanese

corporation formed as a joint venture between Chrysler and
Mitsubishi.
The dealership agreement provided that it should
be

construed

in accordance with

the

laws of

the

"Swiss,

Confederation", and expressly provided for arbitration in
Japan of contract disputes.
Following a slump in the new car market,

Soler

was unable to meet its minimum sales commitments in its
asigned territory.
automobiles
America

and

Soler therefore attempted to transship

to other
the

areas,

United

including Central and

States.

Mitsubishi

South

refused

to

2.

permit the transshipment,

and withheld shipment to Soler

of 1,000 vehicles ordered by Soler.
Mitsubishi
U.S.
v'

District

brought

Court

of

-r.

suit

Puerto

against
Rico

Soler

seeking

in

an

the

order

·

.
compe 11 1ng
ar b 1· t rar1on 1n J apan o f a 11 ege d b reac h es o f th e

dealership

agreement.

arbitration,

The

but CAl -

in a

District

Court

ordered

unanimous opinion,1

reversed

the District Court oh that issue.
not

entirely

clearly

to

mef

On other issues (it is

precisely what

they are at

this time}, CAl affirmed the DC.
The

principal

issue

that

prompted

grant

of

certiorari, as stated in the amicus brief of the Solicitor
General (SG}, is:
"Whether the District Court erred in referring
the federal antitrust counterclaim in this case
to foreign arbitration pursuant to the terms of
the parties' contract".

I should have said above that Soler, in a cross
petition filed in the DC, asserted a violation of the U.S.
antitrust laws by the refusal of Mitsubishi to permit the
verhicles

to be sold outside of the original dealership

agreement area.

3.

The SG's brief, addressing only the arbitration
issue,

argues

strongly

and

persuasively

that

foreign

arbitration of our antitrust laws would be inappropriate.
As the SG put it, the antitrust laws "embody a policy of
preserving
our
laws

competition

national
by

that

interests".

is of great significance
The

enforcement

litigation,

private

and

to

of

antitrust

treble

damages,

significantly furthers this national interest.
The SG states that "every court of appeals that
has

considered

the

question

has

held

that

federal

antitrust claims are not arbitrable".
Mitsubishi
arbitration

of

presents

anti trust

a

second

issues

is

question

compelled

whether

under

the

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards.
correct as

to

the

I am inclined to think that if the SG is
Sherman Act

not

being

the subject of

foreign arbitration, I do not think this Convention - that
is not explicit ~ l with respect to antitrust claims should cause a different result.
Mitsubishi

relies

primarily

decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.

on

this

Court's

Scherk involved

a controversy between a United States company and a German
national

.,.

over

a

securities

law

question.

Despite

the

,.

4.

?
l

Court's prior holding in Wilko v. Swan, that securities
~~'3'3~
claims are not arbitrable in a domestic dispute, the Court
I\

in Scherk held that different considerations were involved
where

a

between a

specific
foreign

arbitration
national

agreement

had

been

made

and an American company with

respect to a securities act question, and that arbitration
was

appropriate.

The

SG also commented

that the treble

damages provision of the antitrust laws is not included in
the

federal

securities

laws,

and

that

this

is

another

distinction.
I am not entirely satisified that Scherk is as
easily distinguishable as the SG argues, but on balance I
am inclined now to agree with him.

I will be interested

in seeing a very brief memo from my clerk.

L.F.P., Jr.
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.lln:prnnt ~nnrl nf tftt ~tb .lltait.9'
Jlas!fingtan. J. ~- 2llffe'!,
CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 30, 1985

83-1569 and 83-1733 Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. ' v. Mitsubishi Motors Corporation

Dear Harry,
I agree.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

jlnpr nu Clfaturl atf tlft ~nitth j\bdt.e-.ulfhtghtn, ~. QI. 2llffe~,
CHAMl!!IERS 01'

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 30, 1985

Re: 83-1569 & 83-1733, Mitsubishi Motors
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth

Dear Harry:
Notwithstanding the extremely persuasive
authority at the end of your opinion, I still plan to
try my hand at a dissent.

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

.juprtmt QI&tltrl it! tlf t ~ b .t'tatts

'lliudtinghm. ,. Q+.

211.;i.ll~

CHAMl!IE:RS 01'

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 12, 1985

Re:

Nos. 83-1569 and 1733-Mitsubishi Motors v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth and Chrysler-Plymouth
v. Mitsubishi Motors

Dear Harry:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Black.mun
cc:

The Conference

tift ·~tb .l6tatts
.zudpnghm. ~- Cl}. 2llffe~~

~uprtmt ~ttttrt ot

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 12, 1985
Re:

No. 83-1569

Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth

Dear Harry,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

J;u.prmtt (!f ourt of tlyt ~ b .jtattsJfas fthtghtn. J. (If. 2llp)l.,
CHAMl!IERS Of'

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 24, 1985

Re:

No. 83-1569 - Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth
No. 83-1733 - Soler Chrysler-Plymouth v. Mitsubishi
Motors

Dear Harry:
I join.

I

I

RJgards,

(n;J
Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

·v•···

•

' .....i..:S·

/

/

CHAMl!IERS

JUSTICE

w .. . J .

o,-

BRENNAN, JR.

June 24, 1985

No. 83-1569
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.

Dear John,
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

;!i»_(

,,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

.tlupumt Qinm-t ttf tlr.t ~ b i\tatt•

11Ju~. ~. QI. 2ll.;i)l.'
CHAMBERS 0,.

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 25, 1985

Re:

No. 83-1569-Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth

Dear John:
Please note in your opinion that I join all but
Part II.
Sincerely,.

•

fa·
T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

83-1569 Mitsubishi Motors. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth (Lee)
LFP out - added by BAB
HAB for the Court 4/1/85
1st draft 5/29/85
2nd draft 6/26/85
Joined by BRW 5/20/85
WHR 6/12/85
CJ 6/24/85
JPS dissenting
Typed draft 6/24/85
1st printed draft 6/25/85
Joined by JPS 6/25/85
TM joins all but Part II
JPS will dissent 5/30/85
TM awaiting dissent 6/12/85

